PRESIDENT OBAMA TAKING OVER THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN: GOOD LUCK WITH THAT

"In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist. We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes.

We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together."
--President Eisenhower's farewell address to the nation, January 17, 1961

"...this system of waste and private profit from public funds...which, when you think about it, is what these wars, the stock market and health care all have in common."

--U.S. officer quoted in Truthdig, November 9

Listen up. The Prez has decided to provide his General McChristal the troops he wants to "win the war in Afghanistan," although he didn't define to the Daddy's satisfaction what the hell winning would look like in a country with few Al Queda people there, with a dusty, mountainous country, with a complex tribal system which acts as its own government, with a lucrative drug economy (heroin), and a government corrupt to the bone.

Whatever winning means to McChrystal and his horde of leaders on the ground, what it will mean to us back here are four things:

1. The war in Afghanistan is the Prez's war now. No longer can he blame it on his predecessor. Sure, Bush made the blunder of getting us there with only about 12,000 troops to train Afghanistan army and to look for Osama Ben Laden, who, it was believed, was still in the area trying to escape to Pakistan. But Bush never cared about Afghanistan. His sights were on Iraq.
2. In making the decision to send additional soldiers to Afghanistan, The Prez is making a long-term commitment of 10 years or more. We'll be there a long time.
3. With this long-term commitment will come increased numbers of U.S. casualties, increased funding to run this war, funding the U. S. no longer has, and a significant lowering of The Prez's popularity. No, this low popularity will have nothing to do with race but policy, which is just as it should be. It's a poor decision of historic proportion; and, as Americans soldiers's death rise and this drawn-out war rages with few improvements, he will deserve all the criticism he gets.

Welcome to the real world, Prez. This real world consists of the one you inherited and the one you have made. Good Luck with that.

Do you feel The Prez's decision to send a significant number of troops to Afghanistan, raising our level there to as much as 100,000 is a good idea?

“Afghan soldiers leave the KMTC grossly unqualified,” this lieutenant, who remains on active duty, said. “American mentors do what they can to try and fix these problems, but their efforts are blocked by pressure from higher, both in Afghan and American chains of command, to pump out as many soldiers as fast as possible.”Afghan soldiers are sent from the Kabul Military Training Center directly to active-duty ANA units. The units always have American trainers, know as a “mentoring team,” attached to them. The rapid increase in ANA soldiers has outstripped the ability of the American military to provide trained mentoring teams. The teams, normally comprised of members of the Army Special Forces, are now formed by plucking American soldiers, more or less at random, from units all over Afghanistan.“This is how my entire team was selected during the middle of my tour: a random group of people from all over Kabul—Air Force, Navy, Army, active-duty and National Guard—pulled from their previous assignments, thrown together and expected to do a job that none of us were trained in any meaningful way to do,” the officer said. “We are expected, by virtue of time-in-grade and membership in the U.S. military, to be able to train a foreign force in military operations, an extremely irresponsible policy that is ethnocentric at its core and which assumes some sort of natural superiority in which an untrained American soldier has everything to teach the Afghans, but nothing to learn.”“You’re lucky enough if you had any mentorship training at all, something the Army provides in a limited capacity at pre-mobilization training at Fort Riley, but having none is the norm,” he said. “Soldiers who receive their pre-mobilization training at Fort Bragg learn absolutely nothing about mentoring foreign forces aside from being given a booklet on the subject, and yet soldiers who go through Bragg before being shipped to Afghanistan are just as likely to be assigned to mentoring teams as anyone else.”The differences between the Afghan military structure and the American military structure are substantial. The ANA handles logistics differently. Its rank structure is not the same. Its administration uses different military terms. It rarely works with the aid of computers or basic technology. The cultural divide leaves most trainers, who do not speak Dari, struggling to figure out how things work in the ANA.“The majority of my time spent as a mentor involved trying to understand what the Afghans were doing and how they were expected to do it, and only then could I even begin to advise anyone on the problems they were facing,” this officer said. “In other words, American military advisers aren’t immediately helpful to Afghans. There is a major learning curve involved that is sometimes never overcome. Some advisers play a pivotal role, but many have little or no effect as mentors.”